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Abstract: 
The UK Supreme Court took the opportunity in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords 
[2017] UKSC 67 to reverse the long-standing, but unpopular, test for dishonesty in R v Ghosh. 
It reduced the relevance of subjectivity in the test of dishonesty, and brought the civil and the 
criminal law approaches to dishonesty into line by adopting the test as laid down in Royal 
Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan. This article employs extensive legal historical research to 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court in Ivey was too quick to dismiss the significance of the 
historical roots of dishonesty. Through an innovative and comprehensive historical 
framework of fraud, this article demonstrates that dishonesty has long been a central pillar 
of the actus reus of deceptive offences. The recognition of such significance permits us to 
situate the role of dishonesty in contemporary criminal property offences. This historical 
analysis further demonstrates that the Justices erroneously overlooked centuries of 
jurisprudence in their haste to unite civil and criminal law tests for dishonesty.  
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Abstract: 
The UK Supreme Court took the opportunity in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords 
[2017] UKSC 67 to reverse the long-standing, but unpopular, test for dishonesty in R v Ghosh. 
It reduced the relevance of subjectivity in the test of dishonesty, and brought the civil and the 
criminal law approaches to dishonesty into line by adopting the test as laid down in Royal 
Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan. This article employs extensive legal historical research to 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court in Ivey was too quick to dismiss the significance of the 
historical roots of dishonesty. Through an innovative and comprehensive historical 
framework of fraud, this article demonstrates that dishonesty has long been a central pillar 
of the actus reus of deceptive offences. The recognition of such significance permits us to 
situate the role of dishonesty in contemporary criminal property offences. This historical 
analysis further demonstrates that the Justices erroneously overlooked centuries of 
jurisprudence in their haste to unite civil and criminal law tests for dishonesty.  
INTRODUCTION 
The recent Supreme Court judgment of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] 
UKSC 67 (hereafter ‘Ivey’) is a reminder of how fraud and property offences continue to be 
an ontologically and conceptually problematic area of law. The Supreme Court took the 
opportunity in Ivey to reverse the long-standing but widely unpopular test for dishonesty as 
laid down in R v Ghosh2, partly to reduce the relevance of subjectivity to the test of 
dishonesty, and partly to bring the civil and the criminal law approaches to dishonesty into 
line.  
                                                          
2 R v Ghosh [1982] 3 WLR 110  
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In making this judgment, the Justices in Ivey held that dishonesty is a relatively recent addition 
to the mens rea of cheating. 3 In bolstering this claim, the Justices engaged in brief, but 
significant, analysis of the legal history of cheating and gambling, concluding that dishonesty 
was a twentieth century addition to theft, and by extension, this article argues, assumedly to 
other offences for which dishonesty constitutes part of the mens rea.  This article employs 
more extensive legal historical research to demonstrate that the Supreme Court in Ivey was 
too quick in dismissing the significance of the historical roots of dishonesty. Legal historical 
research reveals that dishonesty has always been a central pillar of the actus reus of deceptive 
offences. In so readily concluding dishonesty to be a new addition to the offence of cheating, 
and consequently altering the test for dishonesty, the Justices have over-looked the 
significance of deception and dishonesty which lie at the heart of cheating.   
In addition to dismissing the Ghosh test of dishonesty, the Justices held that any test for 
dishonesty must be consistent across civil and criminal law. This consistency has been 
imposed by ruling the civil test of dishonesty, as laid down in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v 
Tan4, ought to be applied to the criminal law. The test was explained by Lord Hoffman in 
Barlow Clowes5 and reproduced by the Justices in Ivey:  
“Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by 
which the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary standards 
                                                          
3 Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67, At para.48. The mens rea of ‘fraudulently’ was 
replaced with dishonesty in R v Williams [1953] 1 QB 660. This made the test about the state of mind of the 
accused, although the Justices then argue the trial judge in Ivey was right in deciding that what was cheating 
was a matter for the court and was an objective test (whether the act was cheating but not the mens rea).  
4 [1995] 2 AC 37 
5 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37; [2006] 1 WLR 1476, Lord 
Hoffman at pp 1479-1480 
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a defendant’s mental state would be characterised as dishonest, it is irrelevant that 
the defendant judges by different standards.” 
The Justices in Ivey made clear that the future test of dishonesty, whether in criminal or civil 
courts, ought to be in line with the approach given in Royal Brunei:  
“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain 
(subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. 
The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice 
determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional 
requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely 
held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is 
established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be 
determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent 
people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has 
done is, by those standards, dishonest.”6 
This article questions this blanket approach laid down in Ivey in so far as it raises significant 
challenges to the underlying rationale employed by the Justices in determining that the civil 
and criminal law ought to be in alignment. In demonstrating how eighteenth and nineteenth 
century jurisprudence actively distinguished between frauds in criminal law and contract law 
in the attempt to define criminal cheats, the need for judicial reflection surrounding the role 
of the criminal law in this area shall become apparent. Analysis of this jurisprudence and wider 
                                                          
6 Above n 3, Para [74] 
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criminal law theory will challenge the Justices’ assertion that the civil and criminal laws 
incorporating dishonesty must be conflated.  
The Ghosh7 test has formed the basis of dishonesty in the criminal law for nearly forty years. 
For an accused to be dishonest it must be shown that the reasonable person thought the 
action dishonest (an objective test), and that the accused appreciated that the reasonable 
person would find his actions dishonest (a subjective-objective test). The Ghosh test has been 
deemed problematic as it allows a subjective interpretation of dishonesty which, as shall be 
discussed below, the Justices held allowed a loophole for the genuine but dishonest thief who 
does not recognise that the reasonable person would believe their conduct to be dishonest.   
The Justices invoked historical research to dispose of this problematic test and, whilst it is 
laudable that the Justices engaged in legal historical research to explore the relevance of 
dishonesty to cheating, the Justices were evidently keen to use the case of Ivey to rectify a 
test of dishonesty which they felt was fundamentally flawed.8 Consequently, the breadth and 
depth of the historical research was limited by the starting point of the Justices, that Ghosh 
was an anomaly in an otherwise consistent history of precedent in which dishonesty played 
no role in the mens rea of cheating offences.  
Taking this standpoint, the Justices engaged in a narrow exploration of the history of cheating 
and the historical relationship between cheating and gambling.9 However, had the Justices 
asked the question ‘what role did dishonesty play in the offence of cheating?’, they would 
                                                          
7 R v Ghosh [1982] 3 WLR 110  
8 Karl Laird, ‘Case Comment: Dishonesty: Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd (t/a Crockfords Club), Criminal Law 
Review 395, 2018 
9 It is acknowledged that the Justices, at para,43, make clear that cheating at gambling is sui generis but they 
then go on to use the discussion of cheating in gambling to open a far wider discussion regarding dishonesty 
in other offences. This article is engaging with this wider spirit of the judgment.  
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have seen that dishonesty has always been a central pillar of the conduct of cheating. In 
examining a wider range of sources than those considered by the Supreme Court, including 
court and practitioner records, this article demonstrates that dishonesty has always been an 
imperative element within the conduct of cheating.  
This shall be demonstrated through the introduction of my novel doctrinal framework. This 
framework is derived from analyses of statute, case law, and contemporary commentary on 
the offences surrounding cheating and wider fraud offences from Tudor times10 to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. This framework consists of three defining doctrines of 
criminal fraud: a) that the fraud must be conducted through the use of an artful device; b) 
that this fraud must have some public harm; and c) that this fraud cannot merely constitute 
a fraud in contract law. 
This article revisits the case of R v Hinks11 as this judgment both illustrates the conflict 
between civil and criminal law principles that sit at the heart of the Ivey judgment, and also 
engages with the over-reliance upon dishonesty which characterises the current laws of theft 
and which set the tone for wider property offences.  
The first section of this article introduces an overview of the case of Ivey, highlighting the 
elements of the judgment most relevant to my argument and how legal history was utilised 
within these arguments. The following section introduces the novel doctrinal framework for 
understanding the offence of cheating. By applying the framework, this article demonstrates 
how dishonesty has historically been a key element of the conduct element of cheating. 
Section three considers Ivey in light of this doctrinal framework, exploring how the Justices 
                                                          
10 Cheating has an earlier history, though this article uses sources from the Tudor period onward.  
11 [2000] UKHL 53 
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might have handed down an alternative judgment had they engaged with a richer history of 
fraud and cheating.  
Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords 
This breach of contract case began in the High Court and concerns the disputed gambling 
winnings of Mr Ivey. In 2012, Mr Ivey won £7.7m in the game of chance known as Punto 
Banco, a variation of Baccarat. Mr Ivey, along with a colleague, identified that certain packs 
of playing cards used at Crockfords’ casino had distinctive markings which could help players 
distinguish face cards from numbered cards. This method of card reading is known as ‘Edge-
sorting’. It allowed Mr Ivey to have a competitive advantage in a game otherwise based upon 
chance.   
Mr Ivey and his companion, Ms Sun, actively ensured they could distinguish between the 
cards through a series of deceptive measures.  These measures included both Mr Ivey and Ms 
Sun feigning superstition in order to guarantee the same pack of cards with the particular 
markings was repeatedly used. In order to make certain they could see the backs of the cards 
clearly, Ms Sun also communicated to the unsuspecting croupier that the cards needed to be 
placed in a particular way ‘to change luck’.12 The croupier was unaware of why she was being 
asked to rotate the cards in a certain way and was innocently indulging what she believed 
were the whims of a superstitious gambler.   
When Crockfords discovered the methods by which Mr Ivey won, they refused to pay the 
winnings on the grounds that there was an implied term in the contract that neither party 
would cheat, and that Mr Ivey had breached this term. In response, Mr Ivey claimed that 
                                                          
12 Above n 3, Para [17] 
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edge-sorting was a recognised technique to improve one’s odds and was not cheating. At trial, 
the judge found Mr Ivey to be truthful in his assertion that he was a professional gambler and 
‘advantage player’, and that he saw edge-sorting as ‘legitimate gamesmanship’ rather than a 
dishonest practice.   
At trial, Mr Justice Mitting held that edge-sorting was clearly a breach of the implied term of 
the contract not to cheat and held that the issue of cheating depended not on the state of 
mind of Mr Ivey but rather, whether this practice was cheating in law.13 When the appeal 
reached the Supreme Court, the Justices engaged with three main questions. First, did Mr 
Ivey breach any regulations of the Gambling Act 2005? Second, were Mr Ivey’s actions a 
breach of contract? Lastly, what was the significance of dishonesty to cheating? 
The Supreme Court in Ivey held that Mr Ivey was not entitled to the winnings as he had, in 
fact and in law, cheated and thereby breached an implied term within the gambling contract. 
As stated above, the Justices took the opportunity in this civil case to alter the test for 
dishonesty across both the civil and the criminal law by laying down extensive obiter dicta 
regarding Ghosh and the appropriate test for dishonesty. The Justices relied heavily upon legal 
historical research to bolster this far-reaching judgment.  
Ivey and the use of Legal History 
Whilst discussion of precedent is common in appellate courts, Ivey paved the way for broader 
discussion of the history of cheating. By way of appeal, Mr Ivey sought to rely on a particular 
                                                          
13 Above n 3, Para [27] 
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construction of the common law offence of cheating as laid down in East’s Pleas of the Crown 
(1803) and restated by Viscount Dilhorne in R v Scott: 
“the fraudulent obtaining [of] the property of another by any deceitful and illegal 
practice or token (short of felony) which affects or may affect the public. It is not, 
however, every species of fraud or dishonesty in transactions between individuals 
which is the subject matter of a criminal charge at common law; ... it must be such as 
affects the public ...calculated to defraud numbers, to deceive the people in 
general.”14 
Mr Ivey claimed East demonstrated dishonesty to be a key element of cheating and, as Mr 
Justice Mitting at trial had ruled Mr Ivey not to be dishonest, Mr Ivey could not have 
cheated.  By co-opting this nineteenth century construction of cheating in such a way, Mr Ivey 
allowed the Justices the opportunity to revisit the fundamental definition of cheating and the 
wider definition of dishonesty.  
The Justices in Ivey ostensibly sought to understand the history, and capture the essence of 
cheating, by tracing the legislative origins of gambling and some of the corresponding case 
law relating to cheating.15 The purpose of this exercise was to understand the role of 
dishonesty in the development of the cheating offence.16 Notwithstanding the watershed 
effect of the Theft Act 1968 in the longer history of larceny and dishonesty, the Justices felt is 
worthwhile to explore the earlier origins of cheating offences in order to retrace the steps of 
dishonesty.  
                                                          
14 R v Scott [1975] AC 819 
15 Ibid, paras [26-51] 
16 This was not the sole focus of the judgment, see Above, n 8 
10 
 
As a number of commentators have been quick to point out, the judgment in Ivey is surprising 
as the correctness of Ghosh was not raised in depth at any of the early stages of the 
litigation.17 In fact, the Ghosh test had recently been considered in the case of R v Hayes and 
had been found good law.18 Perhaps it was because there had been such little argument in 
the earlier hearings of Ivey that the Justices drew upon historical research in their dismissal 
of Ghosh. Moreover, as the Lord Chief Justice had very recently engaged in separate 
consideration of Ghosh, perhaps the Justices in Ivey co-opted historical research into their 
judgment in order to bolster their dismissal of a case recently deemed good law.  
Whatever the rationale for using historical research, the Justices approach focused narrowly 
upon particular sources and failed to identify the significance of dishonesty to the conduct of 
cheating and to other fraud offences. One explanation for the Justices’ failure to recognise 
the significance of dishonesty as a part of the conduct of the offence of cheating is because 
the Justices did not define cheating. In fact, the Justices held that defining cheating was 
‘unwise to attempt’19 due to the ‘extraordinary range of activities to which the concept may 
apply’20 and also because of the ‘inevitable truth that there will be room for debate at the 
fringes as to what does and does not constitute cheating.’21  
The Justices do however identify some common traits of cheating  including ‘a deliberate (and 
not an accidental) act designed to gain an advantage in the play which is objectively improper, 
given the nature, parameters and rules (formal or informal) of the game’.22 The Justices 
                                                          
17  Above n 8  
18 R v Hayes [2015] EWCA Crim 1994; [2018] 1 Cr.App. R 10 
19Above n 3, para [47] 
20 Ibid, para [38] 
21 Ibid, para [47] 
22 Ibid, para [47] 
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further held that a definition of cheating is not required in ascertaining whether dishonesty is 
fundamental to cheating. This is where the judgment takes a wrong turn as had the Justices 
engaged in a more thorough exploration of the definition of cheating through history, the 
significance of dishonesty to the conduct of cheating would have emerged.  
In the rest of this article I directly critique the judgment in Ivey by demonstrating the level 
and depth of legal historical research which might have been undertaken by the Justices, and 
which would have allowed the Justices to appreciate the significance of dishonesty to the 
conduct of cheating.  
A HISTORY OF CHEATING: A DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK OF FRAUD 
The great definitional ambiguity at the heart of cheating was as true 300 years ago as it is 
today. As a collection of offences, cheating and fraud are ontologically problematic. Fraud 
offences exist at the interface of civil law and criminal law and this interconnectedness results 
in fraud and financial misconduct often being viewed with ambivalence in the twenty-first 
century.23 The judgment in Ivey has not lessened this ontological ambiguity and has 
potentially exacerbated the problem of how criminal deception is viewed within the wider 
legal framework. 
Historically, fraud offences, of which cheating is one, can be defined both positively and 
negatively: what fraud was, and what fraud was not. Before analysing cheating, a definition 
                                                          
23 For modern discussions of fraud and white-collar crime see: John P. Locker and Barry Godfrey, Ontological 
Boundaries and Temporal Watersheds in the Development of White-Collar Crime. British Journal of 
Criminology (2006) 46, 976-992; S.P Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, not the Criminal: Reconstructing the 
Concept of White-Collar Crime. American Sociological Review, Vol.55, No.3 (Jun 1990) pp.346-365; E.D. 
Sutherland, Is ”White Collar Crime” Crime? American Sociological Review Vol.10 no.2 (1944) pp.132-139; 
Wilson, Sarah, The Origins of Modern Financial Crime. Historical foundations and current problems in Britain 
(Routledge, 2014); Gary Wilson and Sarah Wilson ‘Can the general fraud offence ‘get the law right’?: some 
perspectives on the ‘problem’ of financial crime. Journal of Criminal Law (2006-2007). 
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must first be outlined. The act of positively defining fraud introduces my three central 
doctrines of fraud: (i) that a fraud must be conducted through the use of an ‘artful device’; (ii) 
a criminal fraud must cause harm which the reasonable member of the public would not have 
suffered; (iii) a criminal fraud must be something other than a breach of contract.24 
These three doctrines are complex and nuanced. For example, a fraud causing public harm 
could be that which ‘such…common prudence would not be sufficient to guard against’.25 This 
doctrine contains the ancient principle that the law should not act to protect a fool.26 Further, 
the doctrine which states a criminal fraud cannot be a breach of warranty at contract law 
includes an underlying principle that the victim of a fraud must demonstrate having 
undertaken some reasonable steps to verify the fraud. At points these three doctrines 
interconnect.27  
When identifying a positive definition of cheating, it is important to recognise the negative 
definition; what cheating and fraud were not. Fraud offences have always significantly 
interconnected with other criminal offences. Across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
there was potential for interconnection between a number of offences including, but not 
limited to, larceny, embezzlement, forgery and uttering, as well as between offences of fraud 
such as cheating, obtaining goods by false pretences, false personation, and fraudulent 
offences against public bodies.28 More contemporary understandings of fraud delineate 
                                                          
24 An earlier formation of these doctrines can be found in Cerian Charlotte Griffiths, Prosecuting Fraud in the 
Metropolis, 1760-1820. (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Liverpool, 2017) 
25 R v B. Lara, 6 Term Reports 565; 101 E.R. 706 
26 See below 
27 Where it is possible, each doctrine will be addressed separately. However, due to the ontological closeness 
of the doctrines, examples will be provided that could apply to one or more of the doctrines. 
28 This interconnection of offences still formed a central part of the discussions of the 8th report of the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee which led to the introduction of the Theft Act 1968. 
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between fraudulent offences and those of theft,29 but historically this was not so clearly the 
case. This over-lapping between fraudulent offences and other property offences acts to 
complicate the treatment, perceptions, and enforcement of fraud offences, due. Providing a 
positive definition of fraud, or at least identifying the central characteristics and doctrines of 
fraud, helps to untangle the ontological ambiguity caused by the relationship between 
deception and other offences.  
Common law cheating has a long history. As a distinct offence, cheating was an ancient 
misdemeanour that can be found scattered throughout English legal history. It was from the 
common law offence of cheating that the doctrines underpinning later fraud offences 
developed and it is because of this status as the common law seed of fraud that we must 
continue to engage with the offence of cheating today. The common law offence was 
commonly used through the eighteenth century and into the twentieth century due to the 
shortcomings of contemporary statutes. In particular, cheating was utilised where the subject 
of the fraud was not money or goods, but rather, financial instruments.30 Due to the statutory 
laws of theft and fraud being consistently deemed in need of reform, the common law 
continued to be relied upon.31  
The first of the doctrines of fraud, the use of the artful device, refers to what would now be 
considered the actus reus of the offence; the mechanism by which the cheat was achieved. 
The other two doctrines refer to the way in which fraud offences operated and were 
constructed by jurisprudence. The need for public harm of the cheat is central to the socio-
                                                          
29 Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
p.204 
30 Above n 25 
31 Above n 29, p.218 
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legal policies surrounding fraud, and the differentiation between a criminal cheat and a 
breach of contract spoke to the changing role of the criminal and civil law through the 
eighteenth century to the modern day.  
The requirement of the artful device 
The artful device of a cheat was the mechanism by which the cheat was carried out and it is 
this first doctrine of fraud where we most clearly see the relationship between dishonesty 
and the actus reus of cheating. 
 Serjeant Hawkins32 described cheating as “deceitful practices in defrauding or endeavouring 
to defraud another of his known right by means of some artful device contrary to the plain 
rules of common honesty”.33 ‘Honesty’ in Hawkins’ context was not a reference to the mental 
element of the crime of cheating. Rather, Hawkins refers to the deceitful practice, or the artful 
device which is itself against common rules of honest behaviour.  
Later legislation, including the Insolvent Debtors Relief Act 1801, contextualised Hawkins’ 
definition of cheating as a crime used by: ‘evil disposed persons, to support their profligate 
way of life, have, by various subtle stratagems, threats, and devices, fraudulently obtained 
money, goods, etc’.34 Here we observe that the heart of fraud offences is the behaviour and 
the method by which property was obtained. The ‘artful device’ is the subtle stratagem by 
which the goods or benefit are obtained.35  
                                                          
32 Serjeant William Hawkins was an important leading commentator on the criminal law in the early eighteenth 
century. 
33 1 hawk c.71 s.1 quoted in Cited in J.W Cecil Turner (ed), Russell on Crime Vol.2  11th Ed. (London, Stevens & 
Sons Limited, 1958) p.1330 
34 41 Geo. 3, c. 70   
35 Through the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century the phrase ‘false pretence’ began to replace the 
‘artful device’. See for example: The King v Gill and Henry 106 E.R. 341; (1818) 2 B. & Ald. 204; Noble v Adams 
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Such a device is not the physical seizing of property36 but is rather, some deceitful manner, or 
‘crafty means’37 by which property is obtained. The definition of an ‘artful device’ was broad 
and flexible, allowing for the accommodation of a range of possible mechanisms. An 
illustrative example of the artful device was the exploitation of information to trick 
shopkeepers into handing over goods or extending credit. There are dozens of such examples 
in the quasi-official records of the Old Bailey, the Old Bailey Proceedings.38 One such example 
is that of Stephen Willoughby who was prosecuted in 1766 for obtaining gin by false 
pretences. 39 Willoughby committed the fraud by claiming to be sent by his master, Mr 
Bicknall. Mr Bicknall was a known customer to the prosecutors, Messrs. Thomas and John 
Isherwood, distillers in Aldersgate Street and Willoughby, and took advantage of this to claim 
goods, ostensibly on Mr Bicknall’s behalf. Suffice to say, Willoughby had no authority to obtain 
the gin. 
There are many such examples of the use of the artful device. Such examples from the 
eighteenth century often entailed the extraction of information that would later be used to 
swindle third parties. These forms of artful device have been historically perceived as 
particularly invidious as they involved ‘those who trick you out of your knowledge, by what 
they commonly call “sucking your brains”.40 For example, a particularly audacious swindle 
                                                          
129 E.R. 24; R v H D Perrott 105 E.R. 422; (1814) 2 M. & S. 379; R v Jackson and Another 170 E.R. 1414; (1813) 
3 Camp. 370 
36 Fraud offences have a close relationship with larceny, the essential difference being the missing element of 
seizure of goods. In the simplest terms, the offences of larceny required that without the consent of the 
owner, a thing must be seized (cepit) and then carried away (asportavit). Fraudulent offences required the 
victim to voluntarily part with the goods. For a history of larceny see: Above n 33; G. Fletcher, The 
Metamorphosis of Larceny. The Harvard Law Review. Vol.89, no.3 (Jan 1976) pp.469-530.   
37 Above n 30  
38 These records can be found at https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/  
39 OBP, Oct 1766, trial of Stephen Willougby (t17661022-58) 
40 John Fielding, Extracts from such of the penal laws as particularly relate to the peace and good order of the 
Metropolis  2nd ed.- (T.Cadell, 1763) 
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committed through the use of inside information was carried out by Matthew James 
Everingham who, in 1784, obtained a number of law texts and criminal practice books from a 
member of the Middle Temple.41 Everingham knew of a companion of the victim and 
approached him under the pretence of being sent by his master, the said companion. The 
knowledge of the victim’s associates was all Everingham needed to obtain the texts.42  
Judges were clearly flexible in their application and interpretation of what stratagem 
constituted an ‘artful device’: 
That the deceitful receiving of money from one man to another's use, upon a false 
pretence of having a message and order to that purpose, is not punishable by a 
criminal prosecution, because it is accompanied with no manner of artful contrivance, 
but wholly depends on a bare naked lie.43 
One caveat to the mechanism was that, properly speaking, mere lying was not sufficient44 and 
this requirement, in line with the statute, was frequently applied: ‘…there must be some 
extrinsic token besides the bare assertion of the defendant charged to have been used by him 
in order to effectuate his fraudulent intent’.45 Whilst this ostensibly appears to be a restriction 
on circumstances within which an artful device could be found, judicial interpretation of what 
constituted a ‘token’ was greatly extended to criminalise cheats which did not fit the statute. 
For example, the 1704 case of The Queen v. Macarty and Another46, in which one of the 
defendants pretended to be a broker and the other a Portuguese wine merchant, in order to 
                                                          
41 OBP, Jul 1784, trial of Matthew James Everingham (t17840707-116) 
42 Had Everingham read the texts he obtained, he may have avoided the seven year transportation sentence 
he received. 
43 As cited Above n 30 
44 Robert Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
45 Above n 30 
46 6 Mod 301 and 2 Lt. Ray. 1179 
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obtain a parcel of hats in return for wine. In reality, Macarty gave him a mixture of stale beer 
and vinegar. The false token was taken to be that one pretended to be a broker and the other 
a merchant. This is a very broad understanding of what might be a false token. The artful 
device in this instance looks like a mere lie, that being that Macarty was a wine merchant.47 
The public nature of the criminal cheat 
The second doctrine at the heart of criminal fraud and cheating was the need for the act to 
be of a public nature. This doctrine speaks to the fundamental purpose of the criminal law as 
an institution existing to protect the wider community and not merely to uphold individual 
property rights.48 Historically, for a fraud to be of a public nature, it had to be demonstrated 
that anyone could fall foul of the cheat, not only that individual. The crime was thereby one 
that required a wider social harm; a fraud that could have been committed against any 
reasonable person taking reasonable steps to protect him or herself.  
This doctrine was consistent with the long-held conviction that the law should not act to 
protect a fool, and the victim of a cheat could only bring a successful case if there was no way 
of verifying the cheat for themselves.49 A complainant of a cheat must have shown that the 
accused did ‘effectuate his fraudulent intent, such as common prudence would not be 
sufficient to guard against’.50 The relevance of the behaviour of the victim reveals both the 
close connection between the criminal law and the jurisprudence of contract law51, and also 
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the significance of blame to the moral core of the criminal law. The criminal law was evidently 
not to be invoked where the victim had invited such loss through negligence: “It was not a 
matter criminal, but it was the prosecutor's fault to repose such a confidence in the 
defendant.”52  
Morality makes a further appearance in the jurisprudence surrounding the criminal cheat in 
that the common law was widely used to punish behaviour seen as unethical or deceptive.53 
In 1789, Ashurst J, in reference to the 1757 Act which codified cheating, held that: 'The 
Legislature saw that all men were not equally prudent, and this statute was passed to protect 
the weaker part of mankind.’54  In the same case, Lord Kenyon addressed the strict doctrine 
of not protecting a fool and reflected the significance of immorality to the criminal cheat:  
‘…he [the complainant] was perhaps too credulous, and gave confidence to them, and 
advanced his money; and afterwards the whole story proved to be an absolute fiction. 
Then the defendants, morally speaking, have been guilty of an offence. I admit that 
there are certain irregularities which are not the subject of criminal law. But when the 
criminal law happens to be auxiliary to the law of morality, I do not feel any inclination 
to explain it away’.55  
What constituted a public harm was open to judicial discretion and the majority of case law 
in this area pertains to trade and the extension of credit. In particular, judges were open to 
extending the definition of a public harm, and thus hold such action criminal in instances that 
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threatened commercial relations.56 Consequently, the public nature of a fraud was often 
interpreted as being a fraud that caused some socio-economic harm:  
'It is well known that a very considerable share of the money transactions in the 
commercial world is carried on by means of the credit given to drafts upon bankers; 
and therefore any fraud which tends to impeach such a security is a matter of public 
concern, as it must necessarily impede the usual course of circulation’.57 
 This judicial desire to protect trade and credit was reflected in later legislation which defined 
cheats and obtaining goods by false pretences as those which led ‘to the manifest prejudice 
of trade and credit’.58 Lying and cheating between individuals was deemed to fall under other 
areas of law such as contract, not criminal law,59 and those believing themselves cheated 
were equally, if not more likely, to pursue their claim in the civil courts.60  
From the second half of the eighteenth-century, cheats that undermined day-to-day 
commercial activities were far more likely to be deemed criminal than civil. The interpretation 
and enforcement of the common law of cheating demonstrates that this motivation to 
protect conditions of commercialism had existed in the law before the period under 
consideration in this article, and continued in earnest well into the nineteenth century.61  
Whilst the use of the criminal law by the judiciary to demonstrate and reflect the socio-
economic harm of some cheats is illustrated by the jurisprudence surrounding false weights 
                                                          
56 See for example: R v Wood 93 E.R. 81; (1742) Sess. Cas. K.B. 80 
57 Above n 30 
58 41 Geo. 3, c. 70 (Insolvent Debtors Relief Act 1801) 
59 Above n 33 p.1334 
60 Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law Vol.3 (Messrs Butterworth and Son, 1816) p.994 
61 James Taylor ‘Watchdogs or apologists? Financial journalism and company fraud in early Victorian Britain’, 
Historical Research Vo.85, no.230 (November 2012) 
20 
 
and measures, not all judges found a crime where a fraud affected a commercial transaction. 
An illustrative example can be found in the 1775 case of R v William Bower concerning the 
knowing exposure to sale, and selling of wrought gold under a sterling alloy.62 Bower reflects 
how courts were generally keen to find a public cheat in cases of trade. However, one member 
of the bench in Bower, Justice Aston, believed there was an important distinction between 
selling by false measure and selling under the standard; selling by false measure was harder 
to check, but merely delivering a lesser amount and the complainant not checking was a 
matter of contract. Cheating was regularly applied to cases involving false weights and 
measures63 as purchasers rarely had the opportunity to verify their purchasers at the point of 
sale. Because of this, if a cheat was carried out during trade, it was often treated as a public 
ill and thus, an indictable cheat.64 Lord Mansfield in the case of R v Wheatley strongly 
reminded the court that the criminal law could not be co-opted in every instance of cheating, 
only where any member of the public could have fallen foul of such a fraud: 
‘And that the fact here charged should not be considered as an indictable offence, but 
left to a civil remedy by an action, is reasonable and right in the nature of the thing: 
because it is only an inconvenience and injury to a private person, arising from that 
private person's own negligence [my emphasis] and carelessness in not measuring the 
liquor, upon receiving it, to see whether it held out the just measure or not.’65 
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The requirement for the cheat to result in public harm reveals the rationale behind the role 
of the criminal law; a preoccupation with the result of a fraud, not with the morality of the 
act itself.  
A further significant area of jurisprudence which shaped the criminal offence of cheating was 
that concerning cheating at gambling or gaming. Because of the historic acceptance of 
gambling at various points in time, the common law was often stretched to great lengths to 
ensure that cheating in gaming was defined as creating a public mischief and thus, indictable 
under the law. The purpose of such an approach was to ensure that gambling and gaming 
were regulated by the criminal courts in order to deter cheating. An illustrative example of 
this is the 1704 prosecution of two individuals who agreed to the outcome of a foot race in 
order to defraud a third person.66  This was deemed a public nuisance as it undermined the 
trust assumed in every day gambling and was ‘publick [sic] in its consequences’.67 This very 
early example of match-fixing reflects the enthusiasm with which the common law doctrine 
of cheating was applied. There are many eighteenth-century examples of courts upholding 
agreements for gambling, even where the subject matter was held to be deeply distasteful. 
One such example is the 1778 case of De Costa v Jones68, in which the parties wagered over 
the gender of a third person. At trial, the evidence had been thrown out on grounds of public 
indecency but at the King’s Bench is was held:  
‘… Courts of Justice do not reject the contracts of parties, because the subject matter 
of them happens to be indecent or indecorous. What can be a greater violation of all 
decorum, than for two sons to run their fathers' lives against each other: and yet the 
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case of The Earl of March v. Pigot, Trin. 11 Geo. 3, 1 was entertained, and solemnly 
adjudged in this Court, in favour of the contract, without a thought or idea of its being 
liable to any such objection.’69 
The case law surrounding cheats is preoccupied with the distinction between criminal and 
civil law and the key distinction between the two was the public nature of the fraud. Lying 
and cheating between individuals was deemed to fall under contract law, not criminal law.70 
Consistent with this approach, the courts would not allow the criminal law to be co-opted by 
cheats, against cheats. The 1758 case of R v Peach et al71 saw a group of gambling swindlers 
levelling accusations of cheating against others gamblers. The court did not hesitate to refuse 
an indictment for accusers who ‘appeared to be a parcel of infamous cheats and gamblers’. 
This is not to say that courts were opposed to gambling per se, merely that the criminal law 
was actively seen as a forum to protect the public good, not to uphold complaints between 
individuals, particularly individuals seen as acting immorally. In addition to criminal cheats 
requiring a dimension of public harm, cheats were actively defined in opposition to 
misrepresentation and failure to honour contracts and this forms the final of the three 
doctrines underpinning frauds.  
Beyond the contract: criminal cheating and ‘mere breach of warranty’.  
It is when considering the third doctrine of fraud, that a criminal cheat must be more than a 
breach of contract, that a definition of the criminal cheat emerges.  
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The offence of obtaining goods or monies by false pretences is perhaps the clearest 
illustration of an offence that existed at the interface between fraudulent criminal offences 
and the civil law. As illustrated above, cheating is the root offence of all fraud offences from 
before the sixteenth century and consequently, the jurisprudence applies across fraud 
offences. A contractual fraudulent misrepresentation might look very similar to a false 
pretence given to obtain property criminally. The jurisprudence surrounding cheating within 
the criminal law in the eighteenth-century often centred around whether the act was indeed 
a criminal cheat, or whether it was a breach of warranty.  
During the sixteenth century, the Star Chamber created a raft of precedent concerning 
fraudulent activities, in particular the criminalisation of fraudulent misrepresentation made 
during the formation of contracts.72 This close relationship between criminal and contract law 
is an understandable one and the doctrines underpinning both contract law and criminal law 
intersect when applied to false pretences. One such doctrine is the requirement in contract 
law for any contractual representation to be of existing fact and not merely a promise to act 
in the future. The practical application of this doctrine can be best seen in the case of R v 
Jennison in which a man promised to marry a wealthy spinster.73 Jennison took money from 
the woman in order to set up house for the two of them for when they would be married. It 
later transpired that Jennison was in fact already married and never had any intention of 
marrying the woman. The court found Jennison to have obtained money criminally through a 
false pretence, not the pretence that he was going to marry the woman, but the pretence 
that he was single and in a position to marry. The promise to marry was a statement of future 
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fact and thus could not be a false pretence; the pretence that he was unmarried however was 
a statement of existing fact.  
Case law across the criminal courts consistently demonstrates that judges were keen to 
distinguish between fraud and breaches of warranties that they felt ought to be pursued in 
the civil courts.74 Lord Ellenborough in particular delivered a series of judgments in which he 
stressed the need to distinguish between criminal false pretences, and breaches of contract.75 
Lord Mansfield76 was equally aware of the interconnection of criminal and contractual actions 
and was loath to ‘sustain an action simply upon misrepresentation’.77 At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, judges were far more likely to find cheats to be a breach of contract than 
a criminal cheat.78 In 1733, Chief Justice Raymond held that even in cases of deliberate deceit 
as to the weight of goods, this constituted a private contract and was therefore not 
indictable.79  
One explanation for favouring the civil law can be found in the 1719 case of Wilders in which 
the possibility of genuine mistake by the seller played a central role in the reluctance to use 
indictments to tackle false weights and measures.80 However, the eighteenth century saw a 
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shift in judicial approaches to the extension of the criminal law in this area, and a broadening 
in the willingness to interpret frauds as criminal.   
This change in jurisprudence during the eighteenth century speaks to two fundamentally 
interconnected issues: the purpose of the criminal law, and how the criminal law was 
employed to pursue socio-economic ends. By shaping the role of the criminal law in 
sanctioning particular types of deceptive behaviour, eighteenth century jurisprudence 
suggests a moral distinction between criminal and civil cheats. This moral judgement was 
deployed against prosecutors or complainants of frauds, as well as the accused. As stated 
above, the criminal law was not perceived as being appropriate to address all frauds and 
where the victim had not taken adequate steps to protect themselves against the deception, 
the criminal courts were loath to uphold their prosecution.81 This distinction in the purpose 
of the criminal law was arguably more fundamental with regard to property offences. Lindsay 
Farmer has suggested the aim of the criminal law to be less about protecting private property, 
which was the purview of the civil law, and more about the protection of the system of 
property rights.82 Without this distinction between private property and public wrongs, there 
can be no public function of the law.83 This was as true in the eighteenth century as it is today. 
The distinction between protecting individuals and protecting a commercial system reflects 
the socio-economic motivations of the eighteenth-century judiciary.  
The socio-economic motivations for redefining frauds as criminal over civil developed as the 
judiciary acted to secure the conditions required for commercial activity. By using criminal 
                                                          
81 This was reiterated as late as the Criminal Law Commissioners 1834, 4th report. For more details see Above n 
29 p.215 
82 Above n 29 p.229; see also above n 48 
83 Ibid p. 84 
26 
 
sanctions to address dishonesty in commercial dealings, the judiciary was declaring such 
actions to be of such social and economic harm, that this harm affected the entire community, 
and not just the individual. This rationale has been discussed above when considering how 
the eighteenth-century judiciary relied on concepts of public harm in order to define a 
criminal fraud. However, this distinction was at the heart of defining criminal cheats in 
opposition to civil wrongs and mere breaches of contract.  
Having set out the fundamental doctrines underpinning the history of cheating, the Supreme 
Court decision in Ivey can now be revisited to assess whether the judgment aligns with the 
historical precedent.  
REVISITING IVEY 
The two most significant obiter dicta from Ivey were that first, dishonesty is a relatively new 
addition to cheating.84 The second conclusion was that whatever test of dishonesty is 
accepted, it needs to be consistent with the civil law.85 Had the Justices undertaken more 
rigorous research into the history of cheating, the first of these conclusions may still have 
been reached, but for different reasons. However, more radically, a history of cheating could 
have been utilised fundamentally questioning the requirement of a dishonest mens rea at all. 
As dishonesty is an element of the statutory definition of theft, I am not suggesting the 
Supreme Court could have removed this from the offence, but at a time when dishonesty is 
being removed from some offences such as the criminal cartel offence86, the Justices could 
have embraced Ivey as an opportunity to signal to Parliament and law reformers the need for 
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a root and branch review of dishonesty. In applying the doctrinal framework introduced in 
this article, the Justices would have recognised how dishonesty is integral to the conduct of 
cheating, and law reformers may reflect upon whether an additional culpable mind, beyond 
the intent to carry out the dishonest act, is necessary. 
Equally significantly, the second of the conclusions, that there is no reason why the civil and 
criminal tests for dishonesty should be different, would not have been reached as the historic 
jurisprudence demonstrates how criminal cheats have been, and ought to be, defined as 
opposed to, and other than, civil cheats.  
Ivey and the significance of dishonesty 
The Justices in Ivey were eager to overrule the judgment in Ghosh and did so by co-opting a 
dramatically abbreviated history of cheating and fraud. The doctrinal framework of fraud 
introduced in this article demonstrates that dishonesty is indeed a newer addition to the 
mens rea of deception offences, but has a far longer history forming part of the actus reus of 
such offences. 
In eighteenth century criminal law, the mens rea of a cheat or fraud was simple intent. 
‘Fraudulent intent’ was often a short-hand for the mens rea of illegally taking87 but this was 
really used to differentiate between lawful and unlawful appropriation rather than adding a 
mental element to the act. Intention is further elaborated by such phrases as ‘deceitfully 
intending’.88 There is little case law or jurisprudence that defines or focuses upon the mens 
rea of cheating, but commonly, variations in the lexicon of indictments at the time included: 
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‘unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly89’; ‘that he, being a wicked and evil disposed person, 
intending to cheat and defraud90’; ‘being an ill designing person, of dishonest conversation, 
not minding to gain his livelihood by honesty, did falsely pretend91’. Lord Ellenborough 
restated the need to show the mens rea of fraud, that being 'knowingly and designedly', and 
went on to detail how: 'A man may innocently obtain goods on a pretence which is false, if he 
do not know that it is false: as if a servant, ignorant of the deceit, be sent by his master for 
goods upon a false pretence, which he directs him to make.'92 The focus on deceit is crucial 
as deceit is not synonymous with dishonesty. To deceive is to act, this does not speak to the 
mental state of the deceiver. Again, the fundamental definition and construction of cheating 
is the actus reus and the artful device. The only reference to the mens rea of the accused 
beyond intent is that they be ‘evil disposed’. In modern vernacular this disposition is closer to 
intent than to any test of dishonesty. It is the act which is dishonest, not the accused.  
The significance of any mens rea to the criminal cheat and wider property offences is still a 
hot topic and one which sits within wider criminal law theory. Stuart Green has written at 
length about the moral core of fraudulent and white-collar offences.93 Green contests that 
any mens rea may prove an ‘unusually decisive’ factor in determining whether an act is 
criminal or not.94 This is borne out in case law, particularly in the case of R v Hinks. Hinks is 
another deeply contentious criminal case which held that criminal appropriation could be 
satisfied, even where this appropriation could not be vitiated in contract law.95 One of the 
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more common criticisms of Hinks is that the criminal element of appropriation, as required 
by the law of theft, has been reduced to vanishing point as the accused can criminally 
appropriate property even when a valid gift has been made. A consequence of this is that the 
mens rea of theft, particularly the requirement of dishonesty, is having to do the heavy lifting 
when it comes to criminalising the act itself. The result is that the accused’s criminal liability 
is determined by the trier of fact’s assessment that the accused acted dishonestly. According 
to Green’s approach, this may not be problematic in the overall logic of the criminal law as it 
is often the mens rea which delineates between the criminal and the non-criminal.96 Mental 
elements of offences such as dishonesty are, as Richard Tur would argue, ‘standard-bearing 
concepts’ within the criminal law.97  However, a number of fundamental criticisms emerge in 
relation to the reliance on mens rea to determine guilt. One such criticism, and one which the 
Justices in Ivey considered, is that triers of fact, which are sometimes juries, can have differing 
concepts of dishonesty and this results in the law being applied inconsistently.98 Not only does 
this make the outcomes of trials unpredictable, but this unpredictability has been argued to 
undermine the rule of law.99 This criticism speaks to the wider issue of jury trials and triers of 
fact. The Justices did not engage with the purpose of the jury trial, that an element of lay 
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participation in the criminal trial is allowed for the very reason of judging community 
standards of behaviour.100  
With so much weight being placed on the mens rea for property offences, it is concerning that 
there persists confusion between dishonesty and deception. Confusion which permeates 
academic and judicial discussion of dishonesty. Green rightly claims the defining characteristic 
of fraud to be deception, but he also equates issues of mens rea with deception.101 Green’s 
analysis, though thoughtful, illustrates how academics, and indeed judges, often fall foul of 
conflating mens rea with the act of deception. This is perhaps not surprising as whilst a useful 
framework for making sense of the criminal law, the actus reus-mens rea divide is problematic 
in that it applies a simplistic binary of conduct and mental state to a series of complex and 
interconnected principles that make up a criminal act.102 Moreover, the law itself makes it 
easy to confuse issues of actus reus and mens rea, and issues of mens rea with issue of fact. 
For example, s.2 (1) (b) of the Theft Act 1968 states that a person is not dishonest if she 
believes she would have the consent of the owner. This has led even Law Lords to confuse 
the issue of the mens rea of believing herself to have a right in law, and actually having a right 
in law.103 In the case of Hinks, Lord Hutton, in relation to s.2(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 states: 
‘It follows, a fortiori, that a person's appropriation of property belonging to another should 
not be regarded as dishonest if the other person actually gives the property to him.’ Whilst 
there is logic to this step, Lord Hutton consequently conflates the factual issue of whether she 
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would have the consent of the owner, with the mens rea element of whether she believed 
she had the consent of the owner.  
The Justices in Ivey acknowledged the importance of some ‘deception’ to a cheat, and went 
so far as to hold that where there is such a ‘deception’, it is easy to find dishonesty.104 This 
confused reasoning lead the Justices to tie themselves in knots when trying to distinguish 
between deception and dishonesty.  
Ivey contains some interesting thought experiments surrounding when a cheat could in fact 
be honest. The examples given include the runner who deliberately trips an opponent, and a 
stable lad who alters the watering of a horse to ensure a slower race.105 The Justices come to 
the conclusion that these acts would only qualify as dishonest should there have been an 
‘altogether artificial representation to the world at large’ that conditions were such as to 
ensure fair competition.106 This construction of cheating is one which could be avoided if the 
historical understanding of cheating is embraced: that the act of cheating, or the artful device, 
is inherently dishonest and therefore, an additional mental element of dishonesty is not 
required. The Justices acknowledge this argument when stating: “Some might say that all 
cheating is by definition dishonest. In that event, the addition of a legal element of dishonesty 
would add nothing.”107 This reasoning could be extended to encapsulate factual dishonesty 
and thereby side-step the ‘unnecessarily complic[ation]’ which the Justices sought to avoid.108  
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The central issue in Ivey was whether Mr Ivey had intentionally deceived the casino and 
thereby breached an implied term of the contract, that being not to cheat. As the artful device 
has long been the heart of the cheat, so too are such devices pivotal in the case of Ivey. Mr 
Ivey and his accomplice utilised a number of artful devices in order to win multiple hands of 
Punto Banco. These included: requesting the cards be placed at a particular angle; requesting 
the same manufacturer of cards be reused and later, requesting the exact same cards be used 
the following day; requesting a machine be used to shuffle the cards thereby ensuring the 
positioning of the cards did not change; and pretending to be superstitious in order to excuse 
unusual requests. 
Unintentionally, the Justices are consistent with eighteenth century jurisprudence concerning 
the artful device in that they hold only the positive acts of deception by Mr Ivey to constitute 
cheating.  The Justices mooted that had a card player merely noticed that some cards had 
different markings and not told the house, it would not be cheating.109 Mr Ivey was cheating 
because he made a positive step to fix the deck, and because he staged ‘a carefully planned 
and executed sting.’110  
In Ivey, the Justices bring the jurisprudence of dishonesty almost full circle. The final third of 
the judgment is a critique of the test in Ghosh, concluding that an objective test for dishonesty 
should replace the objective, subjective-objective approach that underpinned all tests of 
dishonesty.  
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Had the Justices reverted to their eighteenth-century counterpart’s approach to deceptive 
offences and found that dishonesty refers to the actus reus of the act and not the mens rea, 
they could have avoided the discussion of the correct test for dishonesty all together. Rather, 
the issue may have been focused upon whether Mr Ivey intentionally deceived the casino, 
which he did. The trier of fact would not have to ascertain Mr Ivey’s state of mind beyond 
whether he acted intentionally.  Whether an act was dishonest or not, or whether a deliberate 
deception was carried out, would still have to be ascertained by the tribunal of fact and this 
would have required a decision regarding honest standards of behaviour. This approach 
would have achieved the same ends desired by the Justices in that no subjective morality of 
the accused would be considered. As stressed above, the Supreme Court were not in a 
position to alter the statutory definition of Theft, but engaging in this broader discussion 
would have acted as a signal to law reformers and Parliament to revisit the role of dishonesty. 
Ivey and the delineation between criminal and civil cheats 
The Justices in Ivey held there to be ‘no logical or principled basis for the meaning of 
dishonesty…to differ according to whether it arises in a civil action or a criminal 
prosecution.’111 The Justices again employed selected historical sources, including a 
seventeenth century statute112 to support their claim that ‘there is no reason to doubt that 
cheating carried the same meaning when considering an implied term not to cheat’.113  
This decision is surprising in light of R v Hinks. There is a grudging acceptance by 
commentators that appropriation is construed very broadly following Hinks, but that the role 
                                                          
111 Ibid, para [63] 
112 Gaming Act 1664 16 Cha. 7 alongside the Gaming Act 1710 9 Ann, c. 19 and The Gaming Act 1845 (8 & 9 
Vict., c. 109) 
113 Above n 3, para [38] 
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of dishonesty is presumed to act as a safety net to ensure proper criminalisation of theft.114 
However, the Supreme Court cannot have it both ways. It cannot uphold Hinks and also align 
civil and criminal concepts of dishonesty. Appropriation cannot be stretched beyond the civil 
law, and then the test for cheating reduced to a civil standard. This blurs the lines between a 
civil and a criminal cheat to the point where the sole difference is the choice of venue. At a 
time when criminal prosecutions for fraudulent offences are still comparatively few, for 
reasons of regulatory policy and public ambivalence to fraud, the Supreme Court has made 
the problematic decision to dismantle the distinctions between cheating at civil and criminal 
law.  
As with the other doctrines of fraud, had the Justices immersed themselves in eighteenth-
century jurisprudence surrounding fraud, a clear reason for distinguishing criminal from civil 
cheats would have become apparent. As demonstrated, the Justices’ eighteenth-century 
predecessors spent decades deliberately disentangling and delineating between cheats at 
criminal law and what they held to be mere breaches of contract.115  
Eighteenth century judges recognised the seemingly inextricable relationship between 
cheating and fraud in civil and criminal law. They clearly stated that this relationship needed 
to be delineated if any action for fraud, whether civil or criminal, was going to be effectively 
brought in any court. The criminal cheat was fundamentally distinguished from civil 
misrepresentations at contract law by the second and third of the doctrines of fraud which I 
have introduced in this article: 2) that the fraud must have wider public harm, and 3) that this 
                                                          
114 See discussion above 
115 It is difficult to avoid conflating fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract when assessing 
eighteenth century jurisprudence in this area. Many of the cases cited in this section would be considered 
misrepresentation cases today, but the reported sections of these cases are preoccupied with breach of 
warranty rather than misrepresentation.  
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act was more than a breach of contract. These doctrines can be further understood as 
requiring harm which goes beyond the individual, and an act which attracts the declaratory 
and ‘standard-bearing’ stigma brought by the criminal law.  
In his dissenting judgment in Hinks, Lord Hobhouse held that it makes no sense to remove 
understandings of the civil law from the criminal when deciding on property offences, as 
property is itself a concept derived and understood through the civil law.116 However, Lord 
Hobhouse did not go as far as the Supreme Court in Ivey that the civil and criminal law needs 
to be in complete alignment. Property itself is a civil law construct, and so of course some 
understanding of the civil law is required for all property offences. However, the criminal 
cheat is forged in centuries of judicial wrangling which vehemently and intentionally 
separated deception at contract law from the criminal cheat. To unproblematically conflate 
the two is to ride roughshod over the fundamental underpinnings of cheating.  
CONCLUSION 
The case of Ivey is a timely reminder of the importance of legal historical research for 
understanding and developing fundamental areas of contemporary law. Having engaged with 
the historical contextualisation of cheating, the Justices in Ivey rightly held that dishonesty 
has not always formed a part of the mens rea of cheating. Consequently, the Ghosh test can 
be viewed as a relatively recent addition to cheating and that, according to this article, could 
be removed, without affecting the integrity of this ancient common law offence.117 In this 
article I have taken historical research yet further to demonstrate not just that dishonesty is 
                                                          
116 Above n 10 
117 Cheating as an offence was abolished by S.32 Theft Act 1968 but it is the precursor to a range of modern 
statutory offences and to the current conception of dishonesty.  
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not historically a part of the mens rea of cheating, but equally significantly, that dishonesty 
has always been a part of the actus reus of cheating. By introducing a comprehensive 
framework of the three doctrines of fraud, this article has provided much deeper insight into 
an offence seldom, if ever, considered by modern criminal lawyers or legal historians. By 
engaging with the doctrinal underpinnings of cheating, the inseparable relationship between 
the act of cheating and the presence of dishonesty is revealed.  
The introduction of my three doctrines of fraud has also illustrated how past jurisprudence 
intentionally and conscientiously defined criminal cheating as being something other than a 
civil breach of contract. The Justices in Ivey were keen to conflate a central element of the 
criminal offence of cheating with tests in civil law without considering how and why precedent 
so clearly separates the two. Rather than reflect upon the purpose of the criminal law as an 
institution which goes beyond mere dispute resolution and which apportions moral as well as 
legal blame, the Supreme Court has mistakenly united cheating under the civil and criminal 
law. 
The Supreme Court seems increasingly keen to use legal history to support judgments. In 
many ways this is to be welcomed as the use of wider precedent allows for more 
contextualised and, arguably, better supported judgments. However, Ivey is a remarkable 
example of judicial cherry-picking, Justices selecting precedent from past centuries in a 
manner which supports a particular conclusion. Throughout the judgment in Ivey, the 
Supreme Court Justices oscillate between relying on historical sources and then dismissing 
their value. For example, the appellants had relied upon an eighteenth-century definition of 
cheating with which the Justices initially engaged, but then held there to be ‘no occasion to 
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investigate the accuracy’ of this definition.118 This article has demonstrated that in 
investigating the definition of cheating over a longer period of jurisprudence, a wider and 
more accurate definition of cheating emerges, which allows for a more balanced discussion 
regarding the significance of dishonesty to contemporary criminal and civil law. It can only be 
hoped that the Supreme Court will engage in more rigorous legal historical research in their 
future judgments.  
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